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NATION-STATES AND THEIR CYBER
OPERATIONS IN PLANTING OF MALWARE IN
OTHER COUNTRIES: IS IT LEGAL UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW?
John J. Chung*

About 56 minutes into the eponymous film, the fictionalized character of
Edward Snowden recounts his work as an intelligence analyst while posted to an
assignment in Japan. He says the United States planted malware in Japan's power
grid and other critical infrastructure systems.' This malware (according to the film)
provides the United States with the capability to shut down the systems if there ever
comes a day when Japan turns from an ally into an enemy. 2 I had never heard
anything like this before, and three questions came to mind: (1) Does the United
States have the technological capability to accomplish this (the undetected planting
of the malware and the ability to trigger the destructive effects)? (2) Did the United
States actually do this? (3) Is this legal? Since that time, my work has led me to the
following conclusions. The answer to Question 1 is "yes". The answer to Question 2
ranges from "probably" to "certainly." This article deals with Question 3. If the
United States did plant malware in Japan's critical infrastructure, is it legal under
international law? 3

' Professor, Roger Williams University School of Law; B.A., Washington University (St. Louis); J.D.,
Harvard Law School.
SNOWDEN (Endgame Entertainment et al. 2016).
2

1d

In the movie, Snowden also says that the United States planted similar types of malware with similar
intent in other countries, including (but not limited to) Mexico and Austria. Id.
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With regard to Question 1, the United States, other nation-states, and non-state
actors have the ability to cripple or shut down critical infrastructure.4 For example,
in December 2015, a cyber attack shut down the electrical power grid in western
Ukraine.5 More than 230,000 people lost power in the dead of winter.6 This was the
first confirmed cyber attack that shut down a power grid.' Although the identity of
the cyber attackers is uncertain, Ukraine blamed Russia for the attack.8
It appears that the attack on the Ukrainian power grid was not intended to result
in permanent damage. It may have been conducted to send a message. If that was the
case, Ukraine was fortunate:
cyber attack on the power grid would be truly catastrophic. The industrial
control, or SCADA, systems used by power plants and other utilities are
increasingly connected to the Internet. Hackers could exploit this connectivity to
A

4 The Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001 defines critical infrastructure ("CI") as the "systems
and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of
such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national
public health or safety, or any combination of those matters." 42 U.S.C. § 5195(e) (2018). The Department
of Homeland Security ("DHS") adopts this definition as well. DHS has identified 16 critical infrastructure
sectors. They are the (1) chemical sector, (2) commercial facilities sector, (3) communications sector,
(4) critical manufacturing sector, (5) dams sector, (6) defense industrial base sector, (7) emergency
services sector, (8) energy sector, (9) financial services sector, (10) food and agriculture sector,
(11) government facilities sector, (12) healthcare and public health sector, (13) information technology
sector, (14) nuclear reactors, materials and waste sector, (15) transportation systems sector, and (16) water
and wastewater systems sector. CriticalInfrastructureSectors, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC. (July 11,
2017), https://www.dhs.gov/critical-infrastructure-sectors.
5

Kim Zetter, Inside the Cunning, UnprecedentedAttack of Ukraine'sPower Grid, WIRED (Mar. 3, 2016,
7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/.
6 id

Id Since the attack in Ukraine, cybersecurity experts report that the ability of hackers to shut down a
power grid has grown much more dangerous, and "found that the hackers obtained what they call
operational access: control of the interfaces power company engineers use to send actual commands to
equipment like circuit breakers, giving them the ability to stop the flow of electricity into US homes and
businesses." Andy Greenberg, Hackers Gain Direct Access to US Power GridControls, WIRED (Sept. 6,
https://www.wired.com/story/hackers-gain-switch-flipping-access-to-us-power2017,
6:00 AM),
systems.
See Zetter, supra note 5. Russia is also suspected of conducting a cyber attack on Estonia's critical
infrastructure in 2007. The attack shut down Estonia's banking system, telephone and television networks.
Nathan Alexander Sales, Regulating Cyber-Security, 107 Nw. U. L. REV. 1503, 1504 (2013).
8
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disrupt power generation and leave tens of millions of people in the dark for
months. They could even destroy key system components like turbines.9

The attack on the Ukrainian power grid may have been exceptional only insofar as
its effectiveness. There are reports that electric utilities are probed thousands of times
each month by hackers, and that nation-states have designed plans for attacking the
power grids of other countries.o
Perhaps the most famous cyber attack was the use of the Stuxnet virus, which
damaged Iran's nuclear program." In June 2009, someone introduced a destructive
digital worm into the computer network controlling Iran's nuclear enrichment
program.1 2 Stuxnet was the "world's first real cyber weapon." 3 Unlike other worms
or viruses, Stuxnet did not simply hijack targeted computers or steal information; it
physically destroyed equipment controlled by the computers.' 4 Stuxnet directly
caused the physical destruction of hundreds of centrifuges, which are necessary

Sales, supra note 8, at 1514. A report from the Congressional Research Service states:
Attacks on industrialcontrolsystems can result in the destruction or disruption
of the equipment they control, such as generators, pumps, and centrifuges.
Most cyber attacks have limited impacts, but a successful attack on some
components of critical infrastructure (CI)-most of which is held by the
private sector-could have significant effects on national security, the
economy and safety of individual citizens.
Eric A. Fischer, Cybersecurity Issues and Challenges: In Brief, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 2 (Aug. 12,

2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R4383 I.pdf.
o See Scott J. Shackelford, Timothy L. Fort & Danuvasin Charoen, SustainableCybersecurity:Applying
Lessons from the Green Movement to Managing Cyber Attacks, 2016 U. ILL. L. REv. 1995, 2005-06
(2016). The New York Times reported that North Korea wants the capability to launch a cyber attack on
the U.S. power grid. See David E. Sanger & William J. Broad, Trump Inherits a Secret CyberwarAgainst
North KoreanMissiles, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2017, at Al.
" See Kim Zetter, How DigitalDetectives Deciphered Staxnet, the Most Menacing Malware in History,

WIRED (July 11, 2011, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2011/07/how-digital-detectives-decipheredstuxnet/.
12 d

14

See Kim Zetter, An UnprecedentedLook at Sturnet, the World's FirstDigital Weapon, WIRED (Nov. 3,
2014, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/1 I /countdown-to-zero-day-stuxnet/.
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pieces of equipment to make weapons-grade uranium.1 5 It is widely assumed that
Stuxnet was developed by the United States and Israel, although that has never been
publicly confirmed.' 6
With regard to Question 2, it seems highly probable that the United States,
China, and Russia (and undoubtedly others) are preparing for possible war and
preparing the cyber battlefield with the use of "logic bombs" and "trapdoors"-in
effect, "placing virtual explosives in other countries in peacetime."' 7 They have
already hacked into each other's systems to plant such malware for future use, if
necessary.' 8 One senior national security expert believes China has planted logic
bombs in the U.S. power grid, and assumes the United States has done likewise.
So, what can cyber war accomplish? The successful triggering of malware can
control and crash networks and systems.20 Such attacks can steal money, cause oil
spills, blow up generators, derail trains, crash airplanes, detonate missiles, and on
and on.2 1"If cyber warriors crash networks, wipe out data, and turn computers into
doorstops, then a financial system could collapse, a supply chain could halt, a
satellite could spin out of orbit into space, an airline could be grounded. These are
not hypotheticals. Things like this have already happened. . . ."22 There appears to

" Id. ("Centrifuges are large cylindrical tubes--connected by pipes in a configuration known as a
'cascade' that spin at supersonic speed to separate isotopes in uranium gas for use in nuclear power
plants and weapons.").

" See William J. Broad, John Markoff& David E. Sangerjan, Israeli Test on Worm CalledCrucial in Iran
Nuclear Delay, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16,2011, at Al.
"7 See RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT K. KNAKE, CYBER WAR: THE NEXT THREAT TO NATIONAL

SECURITY AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 11 (2010). A "logic bomb" is "a software application or series of
instructions that cause a system or network to shut down and/or to erase all data or software on the

network." Id at 287. A "trapdoor" is software maliciously added to a program to allow unauthorized entry
into a network or software program at a later time without the network operator's knowledge. Id at 28990 (also sometimes referred to as a "Trojan horse"). Logic bombs and trapdoors are just two examples of

what is generally known as "malware," which is malicious software that causes computers or networks to
do things against the wishes of their owners. Id at 287.

" Id. at 31.
'9 Id. at 245. In 2009, U.S. intelligence sources informed the media that Chinese hackers had penetrated
the U.S. power grid and planted malware that could be used to shut down the grid. Id at 59.

2 Id. at 70.
21 id.

22 Id "Military and intelligence officials have repeatedly warned that malicious hackers could disrupt
critical infrastructure with the click of a mouse, causing severe economic loss, persistent blackouts or even
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be no doubt that states possess the ability to cause serious, even catastrophic, physical
damage through cyber attacks.
So, it seems reasonable to conclude that states have planted malware in other
countries (even allied states in addition to states recognized as threats, as claimed in
the Snowden movie) in preparation for a day when it may be deemed necessary to
activate the malware to cause destruction. As mentioned, experts report that China,
Russia, and other countries have been planting malware in the U.S. electric grid since
at least 2009.23 The United States has reportedly engaged in similar activities. 24 The
purpose of planting such malware is to "prepare the battlefield" in the event it
becomes necessary for the countries to engage in war or armed conflict. 25 Every state
also operates under, and feels the pressure of, structural and systemic incentives to
engage in such conduct in peacetime, even without knowing if the need to activate
the malware will ever arise.2 6 Malware planted today takes advantage of weaknesses
and vulnerabilities that may not be known to the affected party. 27 The ability to plant
the malware exists because the other side is unaware of the flaws in its systems and
is therefore unaware of the need to address them. 28 States seeking to capitalize on a
flaw must act quickly, because once a vulnerability is discovered, the other side may
fix it before it can be exploited. Thus, there is strong incentive to take advantage of
the vulnerability today before it is discovered and addressed: 29
The shelf life of vulnerabilities thus puts pressure on countries to exploit them at
present; if they wait until an outbreak of hostilities, the vulnerability might have
been closed by then. This has led to a situation in which countries are actively
infiltrating other countries' systems, planting logic bombs that execute malicious

mass casualties." Catherine Lotrionte, State Sovereignty and Self-Defense in Cyberspace: A Normative
FrameworkforBalancingLegal Rights, 26 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 825, 827 (2012).
' See Caroline Baylon, Lessonsfrom Stunet and the Realm of Cyber and NuclearSecurity: Implications

for Ethics in Cyber Warfare, in ETHICS AND POLICIES FOR CYBER OPERATIONS: A NATO COOPERATIVE
CYBER DEFENCE CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE INITIATIVE 218 (Mariarosaria Taddeo & Ludovica Glorioso
eds., 2017).
.

24
25

Id.

26

d
27

Id

28 Id
29

d
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functions when certain conditions are met or trapdoors that grant access to a
30
system later.

This state of facts leads to Question 3: Is it legal for nation-states to engage in
this activity? Here, the answer is elusive, and the analytical framework to examine
this question is undeveloped. The crux of the matter comes down to this: Is it a
violation of the target state's sovereignty if another state plants malware in the target
state? A follow-up and related question on this issue then arises: "Does the insertion
of malware that could potentially harm critical infrastructure (and thus cause
'intangible' destruction almost equal to powerful, kinetic effects) rise to the level of
an 'armed attack' or an 'act of war?"' 31 The legality or illegality of the actions
described in the Snowden movie go to the heart of two foundational principles of the
public international legal system: sovereignty, and the prevention of armed conflict
and war.
The advances in technological capability have given rise to new challenges for
international lawyers. One school of thought views the issues raised by cyber
operations as a set of issues that may be integrated and incorporated into the existing
systems of rules and structures of international law, while others view cyber issues
as so fundamentally new and different that a whole new set of rules and structures is
required. 32 This thorny issue was summarized by an observation that "the principle
of sovereignty appears to be incompatible with cyberspace." 3 This is because
sovereignty is "an inherently territorial concept," while cyberspace is not bound by
the limits of physical geography or borders.3 4 However, the two phenomena have
been forced "to exist in parallel since the emergence of cyber capabilities," without
an adequate reconciliation in a coherent legal framework.3 1 In short, can laws and

30

d

31 CYNTHIA E. AYERS, U.S. ARMY WAR COLL., RETHINKING SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CONTEXT OF
CYBERSPACE: THE CYBER SOVEREIGNTY WORKSHOP SERIES 16 (2016).
32

Matthew Hoisington, Regulating Cyber OperationsThrough InternationalLaw: In, Out or Against the

Box?, in ETHICS AND POLICIES FOR CYBER OPERATIONS: A NATO COOPERATIVE CYBER DEFENCE
CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE INITIATIVE 89 (Mariarosaria Taddeo & Ludovica Glorioso eds., 2017).

Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul, Sovereignty in Cyberspace:Lex Lata Vel Non?, Ill AJIL UNBOUND
213, 218 (2017).
3

3 Id.
" Id See also Gary P. Corn & Robert Taylor, Sovereignty in the Age of Cyber, Ill AJIL UNBOUND 207

(2017) ("The technological structure and global interconnectedness of cyberspace offers both state and
nonstate actors a medium through which to operate against a broad array of targets, free from the physical
constraints of geography and territorial boundaries.").
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legal frameworks developed for a physical world be adapted and effectively applied
to address issues arising in a non-physical, cyber world?
Part I begins by presenting definitions of key words and phrases. Words like
"cyberspace" and "cyber attack" are commonly used to address the kinds of issues
presented in this article. However, there are no commonly accepted definitions for
words or phrases like these. Commentators may have a general, shared
understanding of their meaning, but each must present his or her own definitions.
Even more traditional terms such as "use of force" do not enjoy a universally
accepted definition. So, Part I addresses the definitional issues. Part II turns to the
nature of critical infrastructure, its importance in maintaining ordered and functional
societies, and its vulnerability to cyber attacks. The cyber threats to critical
infrastructure are the reason why the stakes are so high in discussing the legality of
these issues. Damage or destruction of critical infrastructure has the potential to be
catastrophic, so if the law is to have any relevance in preserving peace and order, it
is here that it must be most effective.
Part n11 examines the legal issue of the relationship between cyber operations
and sovereignty in a general manner, and whether the planting of malware in another
state violates sovereignty. The issue of sovereignty is crucial (according to one
important commentator) because it defines "the normative architecture of
cyberspace." 6 "Perhaps the most operationally relevant, and hence politically
delicate, legal issue with respect to the cyber environment is the identification of
criteria for determining when cyber operations directed against a state violate its
sovereignty."" So, if State A plants malware (that is currently dormant and inactive)
within systems located inside the territory of State B, and if that malware is capable
of being activated in the near or distant future to destroy State B's critical
infrastructure, has State A violated State B's sovereignty? The discussion in Part III
will show that international law is unclear and undeveloped when it comes to the
issue of whether the planting the malware in another state is a violation of
sovereignty.
Because the prism of sovereignty does not provide a clear answer, Part IV will
examine the issue of legality through the prism of Article 2(4) of the Charter of the
United Nations, which provides: "All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of

6 Schmitt & Vihul, supra note 33, at 213.

37 id
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the United Nations."38 Does the planting of malware violate Article 2(4)? This can
be broken down into three specific and related questions: (1) Does the planting of
malware in another nation constitute a "use of force"? (2) Does it constitute a
"threat" of use of force? (3) Is it an act against the "territorial integrity" of another
state? The concept of "territorial integrity" is practically synonymous with the
concept of "sovereignty." To that extent, there may be no material distinction
between asking whether the planting of malware is a violation of sovereignty or of
territorial integrity. However, because a general discussion of cyber operations and
sovereignty does not yield a clear answer, the purpose of examining the issue through
the use of the phrase "territorial integrity" in Article 2(4) is to conduct a more
complete analysis to determine whether that approach illuminates the matter (insofar
as it relates to the discussion of Article 2(4)). Not surprisingly, a particular focus on
"territorial integrity" does not seem to clarify the topic or supplement a general focus
on "sovereignty." It seems the most that can be said is that the legality of planting
dormant malware is an unsettled issue. For this reason, Part V concludes by looking
to rough analogues in other areas of international law, such as espionage, to view
this issue.

I.

DEFINITIONS OF KEY WORDS AND PHRASES

At this point, a summary of loose, working definitions is necessary. Many of
the definitions used in this article are adopted from the Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the
InternationalLaw Applicable to Cyber Operations (The Tallinn Manual 2. 0)." The

3 U.N. Charter art. 2, 1 4. As one commentator put it, "one must look to the U.N. Charters prohibition
against the use of force, or the customary international law principle of non-intervention, to assess the
legality of states' actions in cyberspace." AYERS, supra note 31, at 84.
39

See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS (Michael
Schmitt ed., 2d ed. 2017) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 2.0]. In 2009, the NATO Cooperative Cyber
Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn, Estonia ("NATO CCD COE") gathered a group of international
legal experts to produce a manual on the international law governing cyber warfare. TALLINN MANUAL
ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE (Michael Schmitt ed. 2013) [hereinafter
TALLINN MANUAL]. This began a three-year project by twenty renowned international law scholars and
practitioners to identify the international law applicable to cyber warfare, and their work resulted in the
formulation of ninety-five "black-letter rules" governing such conflicts. Id at 1. The focus of the Tallinn
Manual was on cyber operations involving the use of force and/or occurring during armed conflict. See
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra, at 1. However, the NATO CCD COE recognized the need to address cyber
issues that do not rise to the level of use of force. Id. Hence, in the same year that the Tallinn Manual was
published, the NATO CCD COE began a follow-on initiative to expand the scope of the Tallinn Manual
to include issues involving cyber operations in peacetime. Id. It convened a new group of international
experts, and this group produced the TALLINN MANUAL 2.0. Id The TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 supersedes
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Tallinn Manual 2.0 defines "cyber" to "connote[ ] a relationship with information
technology." It defines "cyber activity" as "any activity that involves the use of
cyber infrastructure or employs cyber means to affect the operation of such
infrastructure. Such activities include, but are not limited to, cyber operations."'1 The
manual then defines "cyber operation" as "the employment of cyber capabilities to
achieve objectives in or through cyberspace."42
The TallinnManual 2.0 also defines "cyberspace" as "the environment formed
by physical and non-physical components to store, modify, and exchange data using
computer networks." The Office of the U.S. President defined "cyberspace" to
mean "the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, and
includes the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and
embedded processors and controllers in critical industries."" These definitions of
"cyberspace" may actually be too technical to be useful. Richard Clarke, a former
National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-terrorism
for the United States, provides a more useful definition of "cyberspace:"
Cyberspace is all of the computer networks in the world and everything they
connect and control. It's not just the Internet. Let's be clear about the difference.
The Internet is an open network of networks. From any network on the Internet,
you should be able to communicate with any computer connected to any of the
Internet's networks. Cyberspace includes the Internet plus lots of other networks
of computers that are not supposed to be accessible from the Internet. Some of
these private networks look just like the Internet, but they are, theoretically at
least, separate. Other parts of the cyberspace are transactional networks that do
things like send data about money flows, stock market trades, and credit card
transactions. Some networks are control systems that just allow machines to speak
to other machines, like control panels talking to pumps, elevators, and generators.

What makes these networks a place where militaries can fight? In the broadest
terms, cyber warriors can get into these networks and control or crash them. If

the Tallinn Manual. Id. at 1-2. The scholars and practitioners involved in the manuals are referred to as
"the Experts" in the manuals.
4 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 39, at 564.
4' Id.
42 id
43 Id.

4 Department of Homeland Security, Directive HSPD-23, Cybersecurity Policy (U.S.D.A. 2008).
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they take over a network, cyber warriors could steal all of its information or send
out instructions that move money, spill oil, vent gas, blow up generators, derail
trains, crash airplanes, send a platoon into an ambush, or cause a missile to
detonate in the wrong place. If cyber warriors crash networks, wipe out data, and
turn computers into doorstops, then a financial system could collapse, a supply
could halt, a satellite could spin out of orbit into space, an airline could be
grounded. These are not hypotheticals. Things like this have already happened,
sometimes experimentally, sometimes by mistake, and sometimes as a result of
45
cyber crime or cyber war.

This description of what cyberspace actually is presents a more accessible account
of what is at stake.
"Cybersecurity" will be used generally to mean (1) a "set of activities and other
measures intended to protect-from attack, disruption, or other threats-computers,
computer networks, related hardware and devices software and the information they
contain and communicate, including software and data, as well as other elements of
cyberspace"; (2) "[t]he state or quality of being protected from threats"; and
(3) "[t]he broad field of endeavor aimed at implementing and improving those
activities and quality."' This article also adopts the definition of"cyber attack" used
by the U.S. military:

A hostile act using computer or related networks or systems, and intended to
disrupt and/or destroy an adversary's critical cyber systems, assets, or functions.
The intended effects of cyber attack are not necessarily limited to the targeted
computer systems or data themselves-for instance, attacks on computer systems

45 CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 17, at 70. In terms of the distinction between "cyberspace" and the

"Internet," the Tallinn Manual 2.0 defines "Internet" as "[a] global system of interconnected computer
networks that use the Internet Protocol suite and a clearly defined routing policy." TALLINN MANUAL 2.0,
supra note 39, at 565. Internet Protocol ("IP") is defined as "[a] protocol for addressing hosts and routing
datagrams (i.e., packets) from a source host to the destination host across one or more IP networks." Id
at 566.
' Fischer, supra note 9, at 1. There is no agreed upon meaning of the term "cybersecurity"; it serves more
as a loose reference. See David Thaw, The Efficacy of Cybersecurity Regulation, 30 GA. ST. U.L. REV.
287, 291 (2014). A similar working definition of cybersecurity is "the policy field concerned with
managing cyber threats, including unauthorized access, disruption, and modification of electronically
stored information, software, hardware, services, and networks." Scott J. Shackelford, Andrew A. Proia,
Brenton Martell & Amanda N. Craig, Toward a Global CybersecurityStandard of Care?: Exploring the
Implications of the 2014 NIST Cybersecurity Framework on Shaping Reasonable National and
InternationalCybersecurity Practices,50 TEX. INT'L L.J. 305, 311-12 (2015).
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which are intended to degrade or destroy infrastructure .... A cyber attack may
use intermediate delivery vehicles including peripheral devices, electronic
transmitters, embedded code, or human operators. The activation or effect of a
cyber attack may be widely separated temporally and geographically from
delivery.

47

The Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 ("CISA") also sets forth
important definitions.48 It defines "cybersecurity purpose" to mean "the purpose of
protecting an information system or information that is stored on, processed by, or
transiting an information system from a cybersecurity threat or security
vulnerability." 9 It also defines "cybersecurity threat" to mean:
[A]n action, not protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, on or through an information system that may result in an
unauthorized effort to adversely impact the security, availability, confidentiality,
or integrity of an information system or information that is stored on, processed
50

by, or transiting an information system.

Turning away from the cyber world, this article also addresses whether certain
cyber operations constitute a "use of force." The prohibition against the "use of
force" is the foundation of Article 2(4); however, the U.N. Charter does not define
"use of force."s' Rule 69 of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 describes the "use of force" in
this way: "A cyber operation constitutes a use of force when its scale and efforts are

4 Memorandum from James E. Cartwright, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of
Defense, for the Chiefs of the Military Services, Commanders of the Combatant Commands, Directors of
the Joint Staff Directorates (2010). So what may a cyber operation accomplish? The possibilities (which
may or may not result in violent effects) include: (1) The exploitation of information available on a
network. Examples would include monitoring communications, exfiltration of confidential data, stealing
of passwords; (2) Passive observation of a network's topology and traffic, which may enable the exploiter
to determine the important routes of traffic, the organization structure of the network, and the relative
importance of those with access to the network; (3) Conducting industrial espionage; (4) Destroying data
on a network or system; (5) Generating bogus or fake traffic and communications on a network, such as
issuing a fake order from a superior officer to a subordinate; (6) Altering data in a database; (7) Degrading
or denying service on a network. See Herbert S. Lin, Offensive Cyber Operations and the Use ofForce, 4
J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 63, 68-70 (2010).

" Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, 6 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1510 (2018).
49

Id. § 1501(4).

50

Id § 1501(5)(A).

sI TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 39, at 331.
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comparable to non-cyber operations rising to the level of a use of force."5 2 Rule 69
will be discussed in more detail in Part IV. However, Rule 69 incorporates the phrase
"use of force" while expressly acknowledging there is no "authoritative definition"
of the phrase.s3 The definition of "use of force" is further complicated by the yet
unsettled question of whether there is a difference between an "armed attack" and
the "use of force;" the Tallinn Manual 2.0 distinguished between the two in its
discussion of the Nicaraguan Military and Paramilitary Case.54 In the Nicaragua
case, the court made this observation: "As regards certain particular aspects of the
principle in question, it will be necessary to distinguish the most grave forms of the
use of force (those constituting an armed attack) from other less grave forms."55
Thus, the literal meaning of this statement is that there are different forms of "use of
force" ranging from "the most grave" to forms that are perhaps merely annoying or
inconvenent.
It is necessary to explore the difference between use of force and armed attack
because it has direct relevance (as will be discussed below) whether the planting of
malware is an unlawful use of force. The Tallinn Manual 2.0 provides a definition
of "cyber attack": "A cyber attack is a cyber operation, whether offensive or
defensive, that is reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage
or destruction to objects." 6 The drafters adopted the widely accepted understanding

52

Id at 330.

s Id at 331.
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J.
Rep. 14 (June 27). There is a view held by some countries that any difference in definition is immaterial.
See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 39, at 333. However, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 offers a substantive
distinction.
5

Finally, it must be understood that 'use of force' and 'armed attack' (Rule 71)
are standards that serve different normative purposes. The 'use of force'
standard is employed to determine whether a State has violated Article 2(4) of
the UN Charter and its related customary international law prohibition. By
contrast, the notion of 'armed attack' has to do with whether the target State
may respond to an act with a use of force without itselfviolating the prohibition
of using force. This distinction is critical in that the mere fact that a use of force
has occurred does not alone justify a use of force in response.
Id. at 337.
s Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J.
Rep. 14, ¶ 191 (June 27).
5

TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 39, at 415.
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of "attack" to focus on the causation and/or existence of violence.17 In doing so, the
drafters emphasize that what constitutes an attack is determined by its consequences
and effects:
The crux of the notion lies in the effects that are caused. Restated, the
consequences of an operation, not its nature, are what generally determine the
scope of the term 'attack'; 'violence' must be considered in the sense of violent
consequences and is not limited to violent acts. For instance, a cyber operation
that alters the running of a SCADA system controlling an electrical grid and
results in a fire qualifies. Since the consequences are destructive, the operation is
an attack.ss

Even with these attempts toward a workable definition, some commentators are of
the view that the discussion of these issues remains complicated by the fact that terms
such as "attack," "defense," "aggression," and "conflict" are not defined and are used
somewhat loosely by experts in the area. 9 According to this view, it is particularly
troublesome that the term "harm" is not effectively defined.s' It raises the question
as to what is meant by harm originating in or related to cyberspace, and how is it
measured: 6 1
Without some understanding of the nature and scale of harm which could result
from cyber conflict it cannot be possible to answer the most basic of ethical

" Id. ("[It is the use of violence against a target that distinguishes attacks from other military
operations.").

" Id. at 415-16. However, not all commentators define "attack" through the criterion of consequences.
Critics of this approach, at times, refer to it as an "instrumentalist" definition of attack. "Instrumentalist
views are often committed to the idea that only harms to material human interests-death, injury, and
senous economic damage-count as the morally relevant cyberharms." Patrick Taylor Smith, Towards a
Richer Account of Cyberharm: The Value of Self-Determination in the Context of Cyberwarfare, in
ETHICS AND POLICIES FOR CYBER OPERATIONS: A NATO COOPERATIVE CYBER DEFENCE CENTRE OF

EXCELLENCE INITIATIVE 50 (Mariarosaria Taddeo & Ludovica Glorioso eds., 2017). Smith offers a
competing view, which he calls the "intrinsic" view of cyberharm. "Conversely, the intrinsic view is that
the intentional disruption of computer systems, making them operate in ways contrary to their design, is
intrinsically harmful to those systems regardless of those effects on human beings." Id at 51.
" See Paul Cornish, Deterrence and the Ethics of Cyber Conflict, in ETHICS AND POLICIES FOR CYBER
OPERATIONS: A NATO COOPERATIVE CYBER DEFENCE CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE INITIATIVE 5

(Mariarosaria Taddeo & Ludovica Glorioso eds., 2017).
6

Id. at 6.

61

Id.
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questions to do with conflict and coercion; where is the threshold at which the
harm resulting from a cyber action of some sort moves from the tolerable (e.g.
inconvenience, discomfort, disruption) to the unacceptable (e.g. multiple deaths,
irreversible physical damage, or even social collapse).6 2

Although there may be uncertainty in defining the precise limits of terms like
"attack," "harm," and "violence," at a minimum, these concepts permit the creation
of a spectrum along which cyber operations may be categorized. At one extreme, a
cyber operation that results in a catastrophic malfunction at a nuclear power plant
would be universally viewed as a violent attack because of the resulting harm. At the
other extreme, a cyber operation that results in a temporary denial of access to
entertainment websites would probably not.63

62

d

63 The possibility of cyber attack and cyberwar has generated its own set of issues and observations
for

some commentators. Such observations include:

Cyber has its own rules / Cyberwar is only possible because systems have
flaws / Operational cyberwar is unlikely to be decisive / Cyber deterrence may
/

not work as well as nuclear deterrence / Cyber deterrence raises difficult
questions: / Will we know who did it? / Can retaliators hold assets at risk?
Can they do so repeatedly? / Can cyber attacks disarm cyber attackers? / Will

third parties stay out of the way? / Might retaliation send the wrong message?
/ Can states set thresholds for response? / Can escalation be avoided?
Paul K. Davis, Deterrence, Influence, Cyber Attack andCyberwar, 47 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 327, 335

(2015).
An understanding of additional terms is helpful in understanding these issues. One such term is
"vulnerability."
For a computer or network, a vulnerability is an aspect of the system that can
be used to compromise that system. . . . 'Compromise' is used here as a verb
to mean to attack or exploit Weaknesses may be introduced accidentally
through design or implementation flaws. A defect or 'bug' may open the door
for opportunistic use of that vulnerability by an adversary. Many

vulnerabilities are widely publicized after discovery and may be used by
anyone with moderate technical skills until a patch can be disseminated and
installed. Adversaries with the time and resources may also discover
unintentional defects that they protect as valuable secrets, also known as zeroday exploits. As long as those defects go unaddressed, the vulnerabilities they
create may be used by adversaries. Vulnerabilities may also be introduced

intentionally. Of course, vulnerabilities are of no use to an adversary unless the
adversary knows they are present on the system or on the network being
compromised. But an adversary may have some special way of finding

vulnerabilities, and nation states in particular often have special advantages in
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II. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND ITS VULNERABILITY TO
CYBER ATTACK
Given that cyber operations directed at critical infrastructure systems pose a

threat of catastrophic damage, and given that such systems around the world may
have already been infiltrated by malware, it is important to more fully understand the
nature of the potential danger. Electric power grids, communications networks, air
traffic control systems, maritime navigation systems, and bank payment systems are
just a few examples of Critical Infrastructure ("CI"). What is overlooked, and
frightening, is that most CI systems are owned by the private sector, and not
protected by the government. Because everyone depends on these systems for daily
activity, personal safety, health, and welfare, one would expect the government to be
in charge of protecting such systemically crucial systems. For example, people do
not expect the private sector to provide CI for the army or navy. But when it comes
to most CI, it is provided by private entities, which are also responsible for protecting
their systems:
Most cyber attacks have limited impacts, but a successful attack on some
components of [CI]-most of which is held by the private sector-could have

significant effects on national security, the economy, and the livelihood and safety

of individual citizens. Thus, a rare successful attack with high impact can pose a
larger risk than a common successful attack with low impact.'

doing so. For example, although proprietary software producers jealously
protect their source codes as intellectual property upon which their businesses
are dependent, some such producers are known to provide source code access
to governments under certain conditions. Availability of source code for

inspection increases the likelihood that the inspecting party will be able to
identify vulnerabilities not known to the general public. Furthermore, through
covert and nonpublic channels, nation states may even be able to persuade
vendors or willing employees of those vendors to insert vulnerabilitics-secret
'back doors'-into commercially available products (or require such insertion
as a condition of export approval), by appealing to their patriotism or ideology,

by bribing, blackmailing, or extorting them, or by applying political pressure.
Lin, supra note 47, at 65-66. The term "payload" is the thing or effect that can be done once a vulnerability
has been exploited. Id at 67. The payload is what interferes with, disrupts, or destroys the exploited
system.
' Fischer, supra note 9, at 3. For example, the air traffic control system relies on Internet Protocol ("IP")
networking to communicate. The operation of an aircraft depends upon systems connected to multiple
networks. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supranote 39, at 259. A passenger jet is vulnerable to interference
with its flight control systems, and its on-board navigation and communications systems. Id. The potential
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A basic challenge in cybersecurity is the fact that approximately 85% of
America's CI is owned by the private sector." The CI systems are owned and
operated by thousands of businesses, which in turn may have thousands more private
entities who either supply, service, or access the CI systems. The national
cybersecurity framework relies on private actors to invest in a sufficient amount of
cybersecurity measures to avoid catastrophic damage to CI. However, few private
entities are required by law to implement any particular level of cybersecurity.'
Thus, it is not surprising that many describe the state of cybersecurity defenses for
CI as "inadequate."P7 The legal framework essentially leaves it to the private sector
entities to set their own practices and policies for protecting their computer systems,
with the government refraining from imposing security requirements." Yet, the
Department of Homeland Security makes clear that protection of CI from cyber
attacks is a matter of national security. 69 President Obama described cybersecurity
as "one of the most serious economic and national security challenges we face as a
nation." 70 The reason is self-evident due to the increasingly important role of the
Internet for personal, business, and government use. The Internet is inseparable from
numerous CI systems, and is in itself Cl." In sum, "the effects of a well-coordinated,

exists to endanger a single aircraft or perhaps even the air traffic control system through a cyber-breach.
Id
65 Sales, supra note 8, at 1506.

' One important exception applies to private firms that contract with the Department of Defense ("DoD")
in certain situations. For example, the DoD has published an interim final rule, which requires contractors
to comply with certain cybersecurity requirements specified by the National Institute for Standards and
Technology. See Interim Rule, Defense FederalAcquisition Regulation Supplement: Network Penetration
Reporting and Contractingfor Cloud Services, U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN. (Feb. 29, 2016), https://www
.sba.gov/advocacy/2-29-16-interim-rule-defense-federal-acquisition-supplement-network-penetrationreporting (the National Institute for Standards and Technology and its role in cybersecurity is discussed

in Part II). This particular requirement has the goal of safeguarding access to the Cloud by contractors.
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement: Network Penetration Reporting and Contracting for
Cloud Services, 80 Fed. Reg. 51,739 (Aug. 26, 2015).
6

See Sales, supra note 8, at 1506.

6 Id.
69

Cyber Security, DEPT. OF HOMELAND SECURITY, https://www.dhs.gov/topic/cybersecurity (last visited

June 5, 2018).
7o Remarks on Signing an Executive Order on Promoting Private Sector Cybersecurity Information
Sharing, 2015 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 3 (Feb. 13, 2015).
71

See Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory ofInfrastructureandCommons Management, 89 MINN.

L. REV. 917, 920 (2005).
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state-sponsored cyber attack against our financial, transportation, communications,
and energy systems would be catastrophic." 72 So, is it legal for a state to plant
malware in another state's CI systems, with the intent of perhaps activating it at some
future point?
III. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS
BETWEEN CYBER OPERATIONS AND SOVEREIGNTY
When it comes to the issue of sovereignty and cyber operations, two prominent
and opposing views of the issue were presented at a 2017 symposium organized by
the American Society of International Law. One view is that sovereignty is a primary
rule of international law; the other is that sovereignty is not a primary rule, but a
fundamental principle that is part of the constitutional framework governing the law
of nations. The proponents of the latter view stated:
However, law and state practice instead indicate that sovereignty serves as a
principle of international law that guides state interactions, but is not itself a
binding rule that dictates results under international law. While this principle of
sovereignty, including territorial sovereignty, should factor into the conduct of
every cyber operation, it does not establish an absolute bar against individual or
collective state cyber operations that affect cyberinfrastructure within another
state, provided that the effects do not rise to the level of an unlawful use of force
or an unlawful intervention. 73

The Internet meets all three demand-side criteria for infrastructure. The
Internet infrastructure is a partially (non)rival good; it is consumed both
nonrivalrously and rivalrously, depending on available capacity. The benefits
of the Internet are realized at the ends. Like a road system, a lake, and basic
research, the Internet is socially valuable primarily because of the productive
activity it facilitates downstream. That is, end-users hooked up to the Internet
infrastructure generate value and realize benefits through the applications run
on their computers and through the consumption of content delivered over the
Internet .... The Internet currently is a mixed commercial, public, and social
infrastructure.
Id at 1006.
72 Admiral Michael G. Mullen, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Posture Statement Before the House

Comm. on Armed Serv., 1l2th Cong. 17 (Feb. 17, 2011).
7

Corn & Taylor, supranote 35, at 208-09.
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More succinctly, Corn and Taylor state: "In short, sovereignty is a principle, not a
rule, and its legal consequences are not fully formed in this area." 74 They add that
international law does not prohibit states from engaging in activities "that might
infringe upon or operate to the prejudice of the territorial state's internal
sovereignty."" They frame the issue of cyber operations and sovereignty as "a
question that must be resolved through the practice and opinio juris of states,
developed over time and in response to the need of states to effectively defend
themselves and provide security for their citizens."" This more amorphous view
would, of course, allow for more legal flexibility in determining whether the planting
of malware is a violation of sovereignty. Indeed, the adoption of this view seems
necessary to establish and justify the legality of such practices.
The opposing view was expressed by the general editor ofboth the first Tallinn
Manual and the Tallinn Manual 2.0. Michael Schmitt strongly asserts the view that
sovereignty is a primary rule of international law, and adds, "[i]n our view,
sovereignty operates to safeguard territorial integrity and inviolability; disregard for
another state's territorial integrity and inviolability constitutes an internationally
wrongful act."" In a related article, Schmitt adds, ". . . overwhelming evidence of
State practice and opinio juris-the foundational elements of customary
international law-supports the assertion that a primary rule not to violate the
territorial sovereignty of other States exists."" Thus, Schmitt objects to attempts to
introduce ambiguity into an issue governed by a primary rule. He then points to the
work of nearly 40 scholars on the two Tallinn Manuals to support this point."
The starting point on this issue in the Tallinn Manual 2.0 is Rule 4, which
provides: "A State must not conduct cyber operations that violate the sovereignty of
another State."s0 This raises the question: What kind of operations "violate"

74

Id at 211.

" Id at 209.
76

Id at 210-11.

n Schmitt & Vihul, supra note 33, at 214.

7 Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul, Respectfor Sovereignty in Cyberspace, 95 TEx. L. REV. 1639, 1650
(2017).
79 Id.

8 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 39, at 17. Note 5 to Rule 4 makes clear that the principle of
sovereignty includes and protects cyber infrastructure within a state's territory whether it is government
infrastructure or privately owned. Id. at 18.
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sovereignty? To address this question, Rule 4 focuses on two factors: "(1) the degree
of infringement upon the target State's territorial integrity; and (2) whether there has
been an interference with or usurpation of inherently governmental functions." 8
With regard to the first factor, Rule 4 breaks it down into three subsets:
"(1) physical damage; (2) loss of functionality; and (3) infringement upon territorial
integrity falling below the threshold of loss of functionality." 8 2 Rule 4 takes the
position that cyber operations resulting in physical damage or injury violate
sovereignty; similarly, causation of physical consequences by remote means also
constitutes a violation of sovereignty.8 3 It also takes the position that remote
causation of loss of functionality in another state may constitute a violation of
sovereignty, although there is no consensus as to the threshold that must be crossed
to constitute a violation.' With regard to the second factor, Rule 4 encompasses the
view that a violation of sovereignty occurs when "one State's cyber operation
85
interferes with or usurps the inherently governmental functions of another State."
For purposes of this article, however, the most important note in Rule 4 is Note
14, which confirms that a consensus does not exist on the issue addressed in this
article. Note 14 states: "Third, no consensus could be achieved as to whether, and if
so, when, a cyber operation that results in neither physical damage nor the loss of
functionality amounts to a violation of sovereignty."'8 This means that the leading

Id at 20 ("The first is based on the premise that a State controls access to it sovereign territory, as
described above, and the second on the sovereign right of a State to exercise within its territory, 'to the
exclusion of any other State, the functions of a State."').
8

82

83

id
Id.

" Id at 20-21. However, there is "full agreement that a cyber operation necessitating repair or replacement
of physical components of cyber infrastructure amounts to a violation because such consequences are akin

to physical damage or injury." Id. at 21.
* Id at 21.
Id It should be noted that Note 6 of Rule 4 of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 states:
In the cyber context, therefore, it is a violation of territorial sovereignty for an
organ of a State, or others whose conduct may be attributed to the State, to
conduct cyber operations while physically present on another State's territory
against that State or entities or persons located there. For example, if an agent
of one State uses a USB flash drive to introduce malware into cyber
infrastructure located in another State, a violation of sovereignty has taken
place.
Id. at 19. However, cyber technology does not require a physical presence or actor in the target state to
introduce malware into the target state's systems. It may be accomplished remotely with no physical
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source of guidance on cyber operations and international law appears to be silent,
and unable to arrive at a view, as to whether the planting of malware (by itself, and
which is dormant) violates sovereignty. Because a violation of sovereignty is
conditioned on the criteria of objectively manifested consequences in the form of
physical damage or loss of functionality, the question remains: What is the legality
of planting malware within another state if the malware is dormant and manifests no
physical consequences?
IV. DOES THE PLANTING OF MALWARE VIOLATE
ARTICLE 2(4)?
Because a general discussion of sovereignty does not provide a clear answer
regarding the legality of planting malware in another state, the next logical step in
the analysis is to determine if it violates some other rule or principle of international
law. If such practices do not constitute a violation of sovereignty, are they violations
of the prohibition of the use of force given that the intent and purpose is to establish
the capability, and create the potential, to cause violent, catastrophic effects? This
leads to a discussion of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.
A.

Does the Plantingof Malware Constitute a ProhibitedUse of
Force Under Article 2(4)?

The U.N. Charter does not set forth any criteria to illustrate what constitutes
"use of force," or offer any "authoritative definition." 7 Because the Charter was
drafted before the invention of the Internet, it obviously offers no guidance to the
even more complicated question of what constitutes "use of force" in cyberspace.
The drafters of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 addressed the use of force in Rule 69, which
provides: "A cyber operation constitutes a use of force when its scale and effects are
comparable to non-cyber operations rising to the level of a use of force."88 The
drafters of the Rule placed deliberate weight on the phrase "scale and effects," which
was borrowed from the opinion of the Nicaragua"judgement. Note 1 to Rule 69
provides:

violation of territory, and it appears to be an open question in the Tallinn Manual 2.0 whether such conduct
would constitute a violation of sovereignty.
*Id at 330-31.
8
89

Id at 330.
Id
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In other words, 'scale and effects' is a shorthand term that captures the quantitative
and qualitative factors to be analysed in determining whether a cyber operation
amounts to a use of force. The Experts agreed that there is no basis for excluding
cyber operations from within the scope of actions that may constitute a use of
force if the scale and effects of the operation in question are comparable to those
of non-cyber operations that would qualify as such. 0

In an attempt to provide some guidance as to the meaning and nature of use of force
as it pertains to cyberspace, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 looks to parallels in the noncyberspace world, and treats use of force in the same way use of force may occur
through kinetic or non-kinetic actions in the physical world. 91 As part of this analysis,
Rule 69 identifies eight non-exhaustive criteria: (a) Severity; (b) Immediacy;
(c) Directness; (d) Invasiveness; (e) Measurability of effects; (f) Military character;
(g) State involvement; and (h) Presumptive legality. 92
Severity: Under the severity criterion, Rule 69 provides that at one extreme,
where use of force is unquestionably present, cyber operations resulting in physical
harm to individuals or property constitute a use of force, subject to a de minimis
rule. 93 An obvious example would be a cyber attack that results in the explosive
destruction of an offshore oil drilling rig or destruction of a nuclear reactor (think,
for example, if Deepwater Horizon or the Fukushima nuclear reactor meltdown had
been the result of cyber attack). At the other extreme, cyber operations resulting in
mere inconvenience or irritation, such as a temporary shutdown of an entertainment
network like Netflix, would not be sufficiently severe to qualify as "use of force."
Other factors that would affect severity would include whether critical national
interests were involved (such as critical infrastructure), and the scope, duration, and
intensity of the consequences.

* Id at 331. Not surprisingly, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 is able to provide only abroad range of possibilities
that may or may not constitute "use of force" in cyberspace. Note 8 to Rule 69 provides that "some cyber
actions are undeniably not uses of force, uses of force need not involve a State's direct use of armed force,
and all armed attacks are uses of force. This leaves unresolved the question as to what actions short of an
armed attack constitute a use of force." Id. at 333.
91 Id.

92 Id at 333-36.
93

Id at 334.

9 Id.
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Immediacy: The immediacy of the manifestations of the consequences of a
cyber attack is relevant and material because a cyber operation that produces
immediate effects means there is little or no time for states to seek a peaceful
accommodation to prevent or mitigate the effects of the operation." A cyber
operation may take weeks or months to achieve its effects, and if detected in time,
states have the ability to engage in diplomatic or other non-military means to resolve
the threats.' Thus, even if a cyber operation's consequences are potentially
catastrophic, if the effects are not immediate, there is time for states to prevent the
operation from turning into an event that causes loss of life or property damage, at
which point it would clearly constitute a use of force.
Directness: In contrast to immediacy, which focuses on the temporal pace and
succession of events in a cyber operation, directness focuses on the chain of
causation." Drawing from a parallel in kinetic warfare, Note 9 points to the example
of an explosion (say, from a missile).9 8 The explosion directly harms people and
property. Not only is the effect immediate, but the cause and effect are also direct. A
hypothetical counter-example might be a cyber operation directed by one state at the
strength of another state's national economy. A state could engage in misinformation
disseminated through cyberspace about the economic strength or weakness of
another country, and even produce glitches in the sales of a nation's government
bonds through cyber operations to hinder a country's ability to borrow in global
capital markets. Such activities might lead to higher borrowing costs for a country,
which then, in turn, might slow down economic activity, resulting in higher
unemployment, and potential harmful effects on those who lose their jobs. Even if it
were possible to piece together this cause and effect relationship, it is highly unlikely
that the international community would view this as an unlawful use of force because
the relationship between the initial cause and the eventual effects are too indirect.
Invasiveness: This factor focuses on the degree of a security breach or intrusion
into a highly secured system, specifically, the degree to which the breach or intrusion
is directly contrary to the interests of the target state." For example, the invasiveness
factor is probably not violated by a cyber intrusion into an openly accessible system

9 Id.
%M.
97 Id
98 Id

99 Id

ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) * DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2018.593
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu

NATION-STATES

AND

THEIR

CYBER

OPERATIONS

PAGE

|

55

of a country's public university." On the other extreme, a cyber intrusion into highly
secure systems of the Pentagon or the Central Intelligence Agency would
undoubtedly violate the invasiveness factor.
Measurability of effects: A cyber operation is more likely to fall into the
category of use of force if its effects are apparent, identifiable, and quantifiable. Rule
69, again, borrows from examples from kinetic warfare. Traditional uses of force,
such as an attack by military aircraft, give rise to numerous ways to assess the success
of the mission. There is satellite and video evidence, and the preparation of battle
damage assessments based on objective and quantifiable facts."o In cyberspace, the
ability to quantify and identify the consequences of a cyber operation enables a state
to determine if the operation has risen to the level of a use of force. Therefore, a
cyber operation that can be measured in terms of damage such as "amount of data
corrupted, percentage of servers disabled, number of confidential files exfiltrated" is
more likely to fall within the category of a use of force.102
Military character: This factor speaks for itself because if a cyber operation
is originated by a state's military forces, it is obviously more likely to fall into the
category of use of force. This factor is also based upon and reinforces the U.N.
Charter's main concern with military actions. 103
State involvement: This factor focuses on the nexus between direct
involvement by the state and the cyber operation in question. Operations conducted
by the state itself (through its military or intelligence services) are more likely to fall
into the category of use of force." This factor can quickly become a complicated
knot of issues because cyber operations can be conducted by individuals or
organizations with varying degrees of connection to a state, and varying degrees of
accountability or control by a state. The individuals or organizations may, in fact,
have no connection to a state, may not be acting at the request or instruction of a
state, and may simply be taking an action to further a self-adopted patriotic or
national agenda. A state may also guide or instruct non-state actors over whom it has

"- Id. Any discussion of Invasiveness must, however, acknowledge the openly accepted practice of
espionage. Every technologically capable country has penetrated, or is attempting to penetrate, highly
secured systems of other countries to gain unauthorized access to information. However, international law
does not place espionage into the category of unlawful use of force. Id.
'' Id at 335.
1

02

id

3

1o 1d at 336.
1

04Jd

ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) * DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2018.593
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu

UNIVERSITY

PAGE

|

56

|

OF

PITTSBURGH

VOL.

80

|

LAw

REVIEW

2018

influence to maintain operational distance and deniability in the event the hackers
are identified. Obviously, though, the clearer and closer the connection between a
state and the cyber operation, the more likely that it may rise to the level of state use
of force. 05
Presumptive legality: As a general matter of international law, acts that are
not forbidden are permitted." Therefore, so long as a cyber operation does not fall
within an express prohibition such as the U.N. Charter, treaty, or customary
international law principles, it is presumptively legal.i07 This is perhaps just another
way of returning to the original question posed by this article: Is the planting of
malware in another state's critical infrastructure prohibited under international law?
The Tallinn Manual 2.0 addresses this question but manages to avoid
answering it. The issue of planting malware is addressed in at least two different
Rules. In Note 16 under Rule 92, the Tallinn Manual2.0 observes:

By analogy, the introduction of malware or production-level defects that are either

time-delayed or activate on the occurrence of a particular event is an attack when
the intended consequences meet the requisite threshold of harm. For the majority,
this is so irrespective of whether they are activated. Some members, however, took
the position that although there is no requirement that the cyber operation be
successful, an attack only transpires once the malware is activated or the specified
08
act occurs.

This issue is addressed again under Rule 97.'" Note 9 of Rule 97 provides:

A particularly important issue in the cyber context is that of 'delayed effects.' An
example is emplacement of a logic bomb designed to activate at some future point.
Activation may occur upon lapse of a predetermined period, on command, or upon

105 Id

0 Id.
107

10

Id
1Id at 419.

1 Rule 97 provides: "Civilians enjoy protection against attack unless and for such time as they directly
participate in hostilities." Id at 428.
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the performance of a particular action by the target system (e.g., activation of the
10
fire control radar of a surface-to-air missile site).

In both discussions of the planting of malware, the attack occurs when the
consequences or effects become manifest (i.e., when something explodes, or
someone is killed). However, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 appears to be silent on the
legality of at least two issues: (1) Is the emplacement of the malware, by itself,
illegal? (2) What is the legality of the situation in the period between the time the
malware is planted and the time when the malware is activated (the period of
dormancy or latency)? Is it illegal if the malware is never activated?
Some guidance may also exist in the International Court of Justice's ("I.C.J.")
advisory opinion regarding the threat or use of nuclear weapons. The use of cyber
weapons resulting in violent consequences would constitute a use of force or armed
attack. However, the development, existence, and perhaps even use of cyber weapons
in the absence of such consequences appears to be legal under international law. This
is the logical conclusion from a reading of the I.C.J.'s advisory opinion: "These
provisions [in the Charter] do not refer to specific weapons. They apply to any use
of force, regardless of the weapons employed. The Charter neither expressly
prohibits, nor permits, the use of any specific weapon, including nuclear
weapons."' It follows that if nuclear weapons are neither prohibited nor permitted
under the U.N. Charter, then the same applies to cyber weapons.
B.

Does PlacementofMalware Constitute a ProhibitedThreat

of Use ofForce Under Article 2(4)?
So far, it seems that the law may be interpreted to mean that the placement of
malware does not constitute a use of force unless and until violent consequences and
effects occur. This leaves open the question of the legality of the placement and
presence of the malware while it is dormant, not manifesting any consequences or
effects (grave or otherwise). Security and military experts around the world openly
acknowledge that most, if not all, technologically capable states have planted
malware in the CI of potential adversaries for possible future use.
The planting of malware is obviously a cyber operation directed against another
state. However, not all such cyber operations constitute attacks or use of force. These

"' Id. at 43 1.
". Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 1.C.J. 226, T 39 (July 8).
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terms do not encompass or include cyber espionage.1 2 Rule 32 provides: "Although
peacetime cyber espionage by States does not per se violate international law, the
method by which it is carried out might do so."" 3 Espionage is widely practiced, has
always been widely practiced, and customary international law does not attempt to
prohibit it." 4 To be sure, the essence of espionage is secret and clandestine
activity.' 15 It is meant to be undetected. The reason for these obvious observations is
that these are also the essential characteristics of a successful cyber operation to plant
malware for future use. The entire point is for the malware to be planted secretly and
remain undetected. In this way, there is a common feature between espionage and
the cyber operations discussed in this article.
Given that the purpose of planting malware is to engage in secret, undetected
activity, such activity does not seem to violate the Article 2(4) prohibition on the
"threat" of use of force. The commonly accepted legal definition of "threat" is "a
communicated intent to inflict harm or loss on another or on another's property, esp.
one that might diminish a person's freedom to act voluntarily or with lawful
consent. . .""6 In other words, a threat is something that is communicated. Acting in
a way to avoid detection is the opposite of the nature of a threat. For this plain reason,
the planting of malware does not appear to violate Article 2(4)'s prohibition on
threats of use of force.

112 See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 39, at 418.

Id at 168. Rule 32 defines "cyber espionage" as: "[A]ny act undertaken clandestinely or under false
pretenses that uses cyber capabilities to gather, or attempt to gather information. Cyber espionage
involves, but is not limited to, the use of cyber capabilities to surveil, monitor, capture, or exfiltrate
electronically transmitted or stored communications, data, or other information." Id
113

&

1
1Id at 169. See also Geoffrey B. Demarest, Espionage in InternationalLaw, 24 DENV. J. INT'L L.
POL'Y 321 (1996) (intelligence activities are now accepted as a common, even inherent, attribute of the
modern state); Robert D. Williams, (Spy) Game Change: Cyber Networks, Intelligence Collection, and
Cover Action, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1162, 1175 (2011) (international law does not condone or proscribe
espionage).
115

See Demarest, supra note 114, at 325, 347.

Threat, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). In Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003), the
Supreme Court described "true threats" as "those statements where the speaker means to communicate a
serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence ..... Id at 359.
116
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Does PlantingofMalware Constitute a Violation of the
TerritorialIntegrity of the Target State in Violation of
Article 2(4)?

This final issue in the analysis of Article 2(4) is probably also the thorniest
(similar to the discussion of sovereignty). The activity at issue involves the
emplacement of malware within the critical infrastructure systems located within the
borders of the target state. By any definition, this would seem to constitute an
unauthorized intrusion or violation of the target state's territory. However, the
precise issue is whether such conduct amounts to a violation of territorial integrity
for purposes of Article 2(4). The concept of territorial integrity is as old as the
concept of the sovereign state and is one of the rights inherent in sovereignty and
independence."' The essence of what it means to be a state is inseparably connected
to the concept of territory. The definition of state requires four essential elements:
(a) a defined territory; (b) a permanent population; (c) a government, and (d) a
capacity to conduct international relations:11 8
The concept of territorial sovereignty is concerned with the nature of the authority
exercised by the State over its territory. The ideas of territory and sovereignty are
closely linked in international law, since the concept of territory itself is concerned

"

Michael Wood, TerritorialIntegrity, ENCYCLOPEDIA PRINCETONIENSIS, https://pesd.princeton.edul

?q-node/271 (last visited May 24, 2018).
"' MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW

185 (4th ed. 2003). Another

commentator adds:
Territorial integrity and political independence are two core elements of
Statehood. Territorial integrity refers to the territorial 'oneness' or 'wholeness'
of the State. As a norm of international law it protects the territorial framework
of the independent State and is an essential foundation of the sovereignty of
States. It extends principally over land territory, the territorial sea appurtenant
to the land, and the seabed and subsoil of the territorial sea. Political
independence refers to the autonomy in the affairs of the State with respect to
its institutions, freedom of political decisions, policy making, and in matters
pertaining to its domestic and foreign affairs. The two concepts of territorial
integrity and political independence are thus linked as the foundation of the
sovereign State. They provide the basis for the external affirmation by the

international community of the sovereignty of a State and the legitimacy of the
occupation and use of its territory free from outside external interference or
threat, and the right of the State to make decisions affecting its territory.
Samuel K.N. Blay, TerritorialIntegrity and Political Independence, OXFORD PUB. INT'L L., http://
opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-el l16 (last updated Mar.
2010).
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with those geographical areas over which sovereignty or sovereign rights may be
exercised. Territorial sovereignty is, therefore, centred upon the rights and powers
coincident upon territory in the geographical sense. As such it has provided the

basis for modem international law.1 19
Many, perhaps all states would view the planting of potentially destructive malware
within their borders as a violation of the right to exercise exclusive power within its
territory. It seems axiomatic that states exercise sovereign control over cyber
infrastructure and operations within their territory. 120
The crucial issue is, however, whether the creation of cyberspace requires
reconsideration of the concept of territoriality and what it means to violate
territoriality. In prescient observations from more than 30 years ago, Shaw saw that
new technological developments were minimizing the importance of the concept of
territory: 121

As far as security is concerned, modem developments have shown that the mere

possession of territory cannot of itself guarantee the protection of its inhabitants.
The era of aviation, missiles, and various devices of mass destruction has meant
that no State can provide absolute security for its people. Therefore, States have
sought to establish their security by other means, such as mutual deterrence,
international agreements, international organizations, and so on. Boundaries as the

19

MALCOLM SHAW, TITLE TO TERRITORY IN AFRICA 11 (1986). Shaw also observed:
Territory is, of course, itself a geographical conception relating to physical
areas of the globe, but its centrality in law and international law in particular
derives from the fact that it constitutes the tangible framework for the
manifestation of power by the accepted authorities of the State in question. The
principle whereby such a State is deemed to exercise exclusive power over its
territory can be seen as a fundamental axiom of classical intemational law.
More than this, Hill declares that 'international relations in their more vital
aspects revolve about the possession of territory.' This crucial role, thus played
by territory and its attendant legal concepts, has been evident in all stages of
the development of international law and changes in the nature and structure
of international law cannot but be expressed in the light of this fact.

Id at 1. This captures the widely accepted understanding of territoriality and sovereignty. The Russian
Military Encyclopedia "defines sovereignty as the supremacy of governmental authority within a
country . . . ." AYERS, supra note 31, at 46.
120 See Lotrionte, supra note 22, at 829.

121 See SHAW, supra note 119, at 4.
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geographical barriers protecting the inhabitants of a territory now play a much
more humble role. Modem technology has also meant that the function of territory

as a means of excluding the activities of other entities has been much
diminished.12 2

Shaw made this observation when the Internet and cyberspace, as we know it, did
not exist. Yet, even the state of technology in the 1980's caused him to observe a
decline in the ability to enforce protective boundaries.1 2 3 More recent observers have
echoed this theme. The concepts of cyber attack and cyberwar are difficult to
reconcile and frame within the traditional contextual boundaries of "territorial
integrity" and "political independence."I 24
The borderless nature of cyberspace and the basic foundation of territoriality in
international law gives rise to an uneasy co-existence. The structure of the Internet
is globalized, and the basis of sovereignty is territorial.1 25 Can these concepts be
reconciled in the existing legal framework? The issue is currently under
consideration at the highest levels of the world's militaries: "[T]here is uncertainty
among experts, both within the United States and internationally, over the exact
meaning of sovereignty in international law and its applicability in cyberspace-

'2 Id at 3-4.
123 Shaw also raised questions relating to the foundation of international law established by Westphalia.
"These factors have led a number of writers to postulate the decline of the Westphalian system of
international law based fundamentally on sovereign territorial states." Id at 4. This concern over
Westphalian principles goes to the heart of the foundational structure of international law.

Indeed, contemporary international law gives each state a right to be free,
independent, and uninhibited from foreign control and forcible coercion.
Sovereignty, a fundamental principle of international law since the Treaty of
Westphalia of 1648, holds that each state retains exclusive authority over
activities within its borders. The principle of state sovereignty over national
territory is a basic tenet of international law, universally accepted as customary
international law. This customary rule of territorial sovereignty is codified in
modem international law. Any limitation on the authority a state has over its
territory is subject to the consent of the state.
Lotrionte, supra note 22, at 851. "The notion of territorial integrity is fundamental to the Westphalian
State system, and underlies the contemporary rules of international law on the use of force, as embodied
in the Charter of the United Nations and customary international law." Wood, supra note 117.
124 Hoisington, supra note 32, at 91.
25 See AYERS, supra note 31, at 72.
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specifically whether the unauthorized access of computers or networks located in
26
another country violates territorial sovereignty and/or international law."l

'

There are at least three competing views on this issue. One takes a strict view
of sovereignty, and adopts a principle based on an international rule of trespass,
meaning that any non-consensual entrance into the territory of another state is a
violation of international law.1 27 Under this view, the planting the malware in another
state would be a clear violation. 28 Another view acknowledges the importance of
29
territorial sovereignty as a foundational principle, but "not a rule in and of itself."
The proponents of this view assert that "one must look to the U.N. Charters
prohibition against the use of force, or the customary international law principle of
30
non-intervention, to assess the legality of states' actions in cyberspace."' There is
a third, more nuanced view, and the nuance is there by design (when considering the
source). While some argue that "hacking" to access a computer network is hostile in
and of itself, in 2012 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin
Dempsey, stated that hacking was not automatically hostile, but that hacks on critical
3
infrastructure could be.'

26

' Id at 83.
127

Id at 84.

128

This strict view seems to be consistent with the following observation:
Although information contained in the cyber realm may be located in a 'cloud'
and the full stream of information flow may not travel through national
territory per se, the physical aspects of cyberspace, such as computers, servers,
phones, and fiber optic cables, are owned by a state or by private companies
that operate in accordance with a state's laws, and such assets are located
within the borders of a governed state territory. The fact that a state's physical
cyber assets located in its territory are connected to the global Internet does
not waive a state's territorial sovereignty over those cyber assets and the
activities involving them. The principle of sovereignty extends to the state's
authority over these assets, providing the state the right to restrict or protect
access to the Internet. States maintain sovereignty over cyber assets within the
state's territory, and therefore these cyber assets are subject to the state's legal
and regulatory control and are protected by the state's territorial sovereignty.

Lotrionte, supra note 22, at 852.
129 AYERS, supra note 31, at 84.
's

0

Id. at 84.

131 See Jack McDonald, Blind Justice? The Role of Distinction in Electronic Attacks, in ETHICS AND
POLICIES FOR CYBER OPERATIONS: A NATO COOPERATIVE CYBER DEFENCE CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE

INITIATIVE 19 (Mariarosaria Taddeo & Ludovica Glorioso eds., 2017).
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The view expressed by General Dempsey makes perfect sense. Why would any
technologically advanced nation (whether it is the United States, Russia or China)
adopt a view that its capabilities and undetected activities are automatically hostile
or illegal? And any nation would reserve the right to view a cyber operation against
its critical infrastructure as potentially hostile. These would be the views of any
rational state actor:' 32
For cyberspace specifically, major nations want stability, but they also want to use
cyber attacks for intelligence and actions in crisis or conflict. If crisis occurs, they
want to avoid unintended escalation-but to be better able to escalate than others.
And, whatever the rules of the road, they want to be as effective as possible in
cyberspace. 133
The existence of at least three views on the issue return the matter to one of the
issues raised earlier in this article. Can the set of issues raised by cyber operations be
integrated and incorporated into the existing systems of rules and structures of
international law, or are the issues and technology so fundamentally new and
different a whole new set of rules and structures is required?1 34

132

Parallels to

the current state of cyberpower have been made to historic and contemporary naval power.

As major naval powers have claimed wider powers in war at sea, similar
latitude will likely be claimed (or exercised) by those states that are most active

in the new field of cyber conflict. The most serious challenges will arise from
states that can sustain heavy investments to develop and deploy the most
advanced means of attack. Probably fewer than a dozen states have the
financial resources, the requisite base of technical capacity, and the military
commitment to compete in this field. We should not expect agreement among
these powers on limiting their capacities, especially if they must negotiate such
limits with vast numbers of bystanders, as has now become the accepted
practice regarding treaties on the law of armed conflict.
Jeremy Rabkin & Ariel Rabkin, Navigating Conflicts in Cyberspace: Legal Lessonsfrom the History of

War at Sea, 14 CHI. J. INT'L L. 197, 210 (2013).
133 Davis, supra note 63, at 330.
* The issue of territorial sovereignty was much more important as a matter of national security and
defense when it developed out of the Westphalian principles of 1648, and remained important for
centuries. Until the rise of modem technology, territorial space was a key basis of national security. An
adversary needed to physically advance into, or disrupt, territory to harm a state. Advancing into another
state's territory required time, resources and logistics. With cyber operations, physical intrusion is
rendered unnecessary, along with all the supporting features necessary to support physical intrusion. Even
outside ofthe cyber world, the concept of territoriality as a key to national defense seems to be diminishing
in importance. For example, in March 2018, Vladimir Putin announced to the world that Russia possesses
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CONCLUSION: IS THE PLANTING OF MALWARE IN OTHER
STATES LEGAL?

So this leads back to the original question: Is the planting of malware legal?"'
The analysis of this question assumes two facts (which may or may not be accurate):
(1) All states with the capability engage in this activity,136 and (2) no state has
engaged in this activity to the point where it has risen to the level of use of force."
Assuming these facts, international legal support for such activities may be found in
two principles: (1) that which is not expressly prohibited is permitted; and (2) there
may be an absence of opinio juris to support the view that such activities are
illegal."' The argument on the second point would be that if states engage in such
activities, there is no sense of a legal obligation to refrain from such activities.' 39

an intercontinental missile capable of reaching a speed 20 times the speed of sound. See Alastair Jamieson,
Putin Unveils New Russian Nuclear Missile, Says it Renders Defenses Useless,' NBC NEWS (Mar. 1,
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/vladimir-putin-set-state-union-speech-clection-looms2018),
n8522 11. Like cyber weapons, hypersonic missiles would reduce the importance of time and distance as
defenses.
.sOne side issue is what prevents nations from engaging in cyber attacks through the use of undetected
malware. The simple answer is deterrence. If one technologically advanced state engaged in a cyber attack
on another advanced state, the target state would respond in kind. See generallyDavis, supra note 63, at
336-37.
136 Cyber attacks are already pervasive, commonly in use for spying, harassment,
theft, and intimidation,
but remaining below the level of "armed attack." See Rabkin & Rabkin, supra note 132, at 255.

13' This assumption is complicated by the events surrounding Stuxnet. Stuxnet caused significant physical

damage within Iran, and it is widely assumed that the United States and Israel developed and employed
Stuxnet. However, neither country has ever admitted its role involving Stuxnet, and the international
community is unwilling or unable to squarely place liability for Stuxnet on either state. In my own
discussions with leading experts on matters of cybersecurity, every one of the experts began his discussion
of Stuxnet with the phrase "assuming the United States and Israel were responsible," and at least one of
the experts (whom I met in Geneva) had no reason to take a sympathetic view of U.S. actions.
"' The widely accepted understanding of opinio juris is that for a principle to become customary
international law, the principle must reflect consistent state practice, and that states must engage in such
practice out of a sense of a legal obligation (opinio juris). See JANIS, supra note 118, at 46-47.
"9 Several commentators urge the issue of cyber operations to be taken out of the realm of customary
international law or unaddressed legal prohibitions, and be placed into the realm of formal agreements.
At the extreme, a cyber attack might produce catastrophic effects. A
determined enemy might, for example, devise a cyber offensive which
disabled the electric power grid of a target state for an extended period. In a
full-scale conflict, a blow of that kind might have strategic effect, but also
cause vast suffering. Without rail service or reliable refrigeration, portions of
the civilian population might be exposed to extreme food shortages, even to

ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) * DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2018.593
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu

NATION-STATES

AND

THEIR

CYBER

OPERATIONS

PAGE

| 65

Perhaps this leaves the legality of planting malware in the same murky area of
legality as espionage. The Experts who wrote the Tallinn Manual2.0 acknowledged
that espionage is not prohibited by customary international law.1 " Instead, it seems
to lack a clear legal justification, even though all states engage in it.14 1 However,
Professor Schmitt made an interesting observation in response to those who attempt
to justify the legality of cyber operations through comparisons to espionage:
For espionage conducted on another state's territory to be lawful, it would have to
constitute a customary exception to the general principle of territorial integrity and
inviolability. While extensive state practice offers support for this proposition, the
lack of opinio juris cuts the other way. As Quincy Wright opined in 1962, the
'frequent practice has not established a rule of law because the practice is
accompanied not by a sense of right buy by a sense of wrong.' Indeed, if contrary
state practice alone sufficed in the abstract to undercut a customary norm, both the
prohibitions on intervention and the use of force would be at risk.' 42
In other words, states engage in espionage not out of a sense of legal obligation, but
with the understanding that they are engaged in legally dubious activity. This is
especially true given that each state criminalizes espionage when it is the target. The
same can probably be said of the practice of planting dormant malware in another
state's CI. States engage in the practice of espionage knowing that its legality is
dubious, and criminalize it when they are the target.

the spread of epidemic diseases. A long line of commentators has, accordingly,
warned that cyber weapons might prove so devastating to civilians that their
use should be constrained by formal international agreements. Other
commentators have argued that with all their potential for catastrophic harm to
civilians, cyber attacks would not likely secure decisive results in military
terms. No first strike could hope to knock out the target state's capacity to
retaliate, even in the cyber realm. Nor could the state that absorbed an initial
cyber attack strike hope to eliminate the attacker's capacity to launch further
cyber strikes. Some analysts conclude, therefore, that the most sensible course
would be to head off a costly and futile arms race in cyberspace by negotiating
formal agreements never to deploy cyber attacks for military purposes.

Rabkin & Rabkin, supra note 132, at 252-53.
'

40

See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 39, at 169.

See Raphael Bitton, The Legitimacy of Spying Among Nations, 29 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1009, 1010
(2014).
141

142 Schmitt & Vihul, supra note 33, at 217.
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At the same time, it is impossible to ignore the reality of state practice and

international relations. Powerful states with the ability to engage in the conduct will
not abandon the practice simply because some commentators object to it, and such
states will not make an admission that their conduct is unlawful (assuming they
acknowledge that they engage in the practice in the first place). Again, as Professor
Schmitt observed:
Of course, we are sensitive to the fact that states generally act pragmatically in
their international relations. Most have an interest in engaging in espionage,
although conversely they do not tolerate espionage on their own territory, as
evidenced by its universal criminalization in domestic law. The situation is
inherently paradoxical-states proscribe the very conduct in which their own
agents engage. It is accordingly rational that international law does not prohibit
espionage per se, since it is so prevalent, but rather only certain methods by which
it is conducted.

14 3

So, perhaps this is the current status of the law when it comes to cyber operations to
plant malware in the CI of other states. It is highly likely (if not certain) that states
with the technological ability to engage in malware operations do engage in them.
Such states are able to argue with principled support that such practices are not
explicitly proscribed. Perhaps ironically, it would also not make sense for any state
that engages in them to openly advocate legality because then it would draw attention
to a practice that is, by design, meant to be unknown and undetected. At the same
time, it would be irrational for such states to advocate that such practices should be

illegal.
The only states that would rationally express open objection to the practice
would be states that are not as technologically adept as the states that can engage in
such practices at the most advanced levels. However, that lack of technological
power would also be an indication of a lack of power to influence customary
international law, change state practice, or influence opinio juris. It would also
indicate a lack of power and influence to advocate for and advance efforts to achieve
written international agreement on the matter. Under these circumstances, the legal
uncertainty and murkiness may remain the prevailing situation for the foreseeable
future, and it seems highly unlikely that such practices will become explicitly
unlawful under international law (pending unforeseen changes in circumstances and
technology). To return to Professor Schmitt again, he concluded an article with this
warning:

43

Id. at 218.
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Lastly, we must be realistic. States, whether they are allies of the United States or
not, whether they know of the purported U.S. counterterrorist operations occurring
on cyber infrastructure located on their territory or not, and whether they are cyber
capable or not, are unlikely to tolerate foreign cyber operations on their territory.
Given U.S. technological supremacy and the fact that territorial states are often
oblivious to effects manifesting on their cyber infrastructure, it may seem sensible
to refuse to acknowledge the normative firewall that sovereignty represents. But
in the long term, this approach is bound to backfire, with political damage
potentially outweighing what can be gained from such cyber operations.
Advocates of the approach will inevitably learn that sovereignty-violating cyber
operations can only be pursued as a measure of last resort and with full knowledge
"

of the likely reactions. 1

Despite this warning, if the reports of malware planted by China on America's power
grid and vice versa are accurate, and if the allegations in the Snowden film are also
accurate, one wonders whether actual state practice has already gone far beyond what
such warnings are trying to prevent.

'" Id.
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